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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
v. 
ALAN BOSWORTH SMITH, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 
Case No. 950640-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM AN OPINION 
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari arises from an appeal 
from a judgment and conviction for tampering with evidence, a 2nd 
degree felony reduced to a 3rd degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S. 
Young, Judge, presiding. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to construe an 
element of the tampering offense in connection with assessing the 
sufficiency of the evidence? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals in State v. Smith, 303 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 {Utah App. November 7# 1996) # is attached hereto 
as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On November 7, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
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opinion in this case. This Court granted Petitioner Alan Bosworth 
Smith ("Smith") an extension of time in which to file this Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari up to and including January 6, 1997, 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995) provides: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with 
a purpose to impair its verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to 
be false with a purpose to deceive a public servant who 
is or may be engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated February 24, 1995, and amended on 
June 27, 1995, the state charged Smith with criminal homicide 
manslaughter, concealing a corpse, and tampering with evidence, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 
(1995). (Record on Appeal ("R.") at 11-13, 141-43.) A three-day 
jury trial was held in July 1995 on all three counts. (R. 332-
816.) 
On July 27, 1995, the jury rendered a verdict acquitting Smith 
of criminal homicide manslaughter and convicting him of concealing 
a corpse and tampering with evidence. (R. 219-24.) On September 18, 
1995, the trial court dismissed the conviction for concealing, 
reduced the tampering conviction to a 3rd degree felony, and 
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sentenced Smith to serve zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison, (R. 254.) 
On appeal, Smith argued, among other things, that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the conviction. He identified gaps in 
the evidence and a failure on the state's part to prove up the 
charge. (Brief of Appellant filed with the Utah Court of Appeals 
("Appellant's Brief"), at pp. 13-21.) Although the Utah Court of 
Appeals considered the "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" argument on 
the merits, it refused to engage in statutory construction in order 
to define the elements. The Utah Court of Appeals contends Smith 
was required to raise "statutory construction" as an argument for 
appeal purposes, separate from raising the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence issue. According to the opinion, a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence review will not necessarily require the court to construe 
the elements of the offense as set forth in the statute. Smith, 3 03 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 and 18, n. 2. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Smith of the 
tampering offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 20, 1995, John C. Barrett ("Barrett") went to 
Smith's trailer home in Murray, Utah. (R. 522-23.) Approximately 
10 to 12 other people, including Valerie Mackert ("Mackert"), 
Othello Gerety ("Gerety")# Schuyler Olsen ("Olsen")# David Smith 
("David"), and a man named "Kevin" ("Kevin"), were at the trailer 
at various times throughout the evening. (R. 521-22, 580-83, 655, 
710-11.) 
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Barrett brought heroin and cocaine with him, (R. 656-) He 
gave some of the drugs to people at the trailer, left at one point 
during the evening, and returned with more cocaine. (R. 525-26.) 
Throughout the evening, Gerety observed Barrett injecting himself 
with and ingesting drugs. (R. 656.) At or about midnight, Barrett 
collapsed. (R. 526-27, 585, 657.) Smith was summoned to help. 
(R. 527-28, 602, 739.) Barrett was eventually revived. (R. 527-29, 
541-42, 602-03.) Those at the trailer that evening believed 
Barrett would be fine. (R. 528-29, 541-42, 588, 593, 675, 714-15.) 
Smith and Kevin helped Barrett into a bed in Smith's spare room 
(R. 529-30, 602-03), and the party broke up. (R. 531.) Everyone 
left the trailer except Barrett, Smith, Gerety, and Mackert. 
(R. 531, 602-03.) 
Thereafter, Smith instructed Gerety and/or Mackert to clean up 
the trailer, which they did, placing garbage, including unused 
syringes, into garbage bags. (R. 602-04, 613, 667.) Gerety was a 
former heroin user. Detective Alex Huggard ("Detective Huggard") 
testified that Smith had been after her for some time prior to 
February 20, 1995, to dispose of drug paraphernalia unrelated to 
the party that night and in her possession. Smith again directed 
Gerety that evening to throw the paraphernalia away. (R. 613-14.) 
Huggard also testified that Smith instructed Gerety and Mackert to 
clean up paraphernalia because he did not want to explain it to 
police if he had to call them for Barrett. (R. 603-04, 609, 631.) 
No evidence was presented at trial to support the proposition 
that the garbage gathered and thrown out consisted of syringes or 
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other paraphernalia used at the party or at Smith's home on the 
evening of February 20, 1995, or at anytime. (See R. 613-14, 666-
68.) After the garbage was collected, Smith placed it in his jeep 
for disposal at a later time. (R. 532-33, 838-39.) 
Sometime during the morning of February 21, Smith stated he 
believed Barrett had passed away. (R. 531, 605.) Gerety became 
hysterical and demanded that Smith and Mackert take her to Project 
Reality for methadone at 700 South between 1st and 2nd East in Salt 
Lake City. (R. 531-32, 666.) While Gerety was at Project Reality, 
Mackert and Smith went to a convenience store to purchase mixers. 
(R. 534, 838.) Smith threw the garbage from the back of his jeep 
into the convenience store dumpster. (R. 605, 667-68, 838.) 
Later that afternoon, Smith and Mackert returned to the 
trailer without Gerety (R. 535-36), and Smith notified authorities 
of a fatal drug overdose. (R. 484, 605.) Officers arrived and 
later questioned Smith about "drug paraphernalia." Smith took po-
lice to the convenience store dumpster where he retrieved garbage 
bags, at least one of which contained unused syringes along with 
other garbage items. (R. 599, 607, 640-41.) 
During the jury trial, the State identified as Exhibit "S-6" 
a garbage bag that Smith retrieved from the dumpster on 
February 21, 1995. (R. 606-609.) The state's witness testified 
that one of the retrieved garbage bags contained drug parapher-
nalia. (R. 610-11.) However, the State failed to present evidence 
that the retrieved "drug paraphernalia" was used by Smith, Barrett 
or anyone else on February 20, 1995, or at anytime. Indeed, 
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Exhibit l!S-6l! contained unused syringes. The record is void of 
evidence linking the contents of "S-6" to the events of 
February 20, 1995, or to any pending or potential investigation or 
proceeding. (See trial record in general; R. 524, €06-07, 63 8 
(state witness testified that the state did not analyze or test the 
items for the presence of drugs).) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Smith of 
the manslaughter charge and convicted him of concealing a corpse 
and tampering with evidence. (R. 219-221.) The trial court 
dismissed the concealing conviction, reduced the tampering 
conviction to a 3rd degree felony, and sentenced Smith to serve 
zero to five years imprisonment. (R. 254; 846.) The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE -- WHETHER A COURT MUST 
ENGAGE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO DEFINE ELEMENTS TO BE 
PROVED IN ASSESSING SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE -- IS OF 
SUCH IMPORTANCE TO WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT. 
Pursuant to Rule 46, Utah R. App. P., this Court may grant 
certiorari review of an issue for special and important reasons, 
including the following: when the court of appeals has rendered a 
decision in conflict with a prior decision "on the same issue of 
law;" when the court of appeals "has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise" of this Court's power or 
supervision; or when the court of appeals has decided an important 
question of law which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
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Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(1) through (4) (1996). 
The issue presented in this case -- whether a court assessing 
the sufficiency of evidence is required to engage in statutory 
construction to define the elements to be proved -- is an important 
and special issue that should be settled by this Court. The Utah 
Court of Appeals' refusal to engage in statutory construction in 
connection with assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in this 
matter is a considerable departure from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings. Smith respectfully requests this 
Court exercise its discretion to grant certiorari in this matter in 
order to clarify the obligations of the courts in this jurisdiction 
in determining questions of sufficiency. 
A. CONSTRUING A STATUTE TO DETERMINE THE ELEMENTS IS THE 
ACCEPTABLE AND USUAL COURSE OF PROCEEDING WITH A SUFFICIENCY 
ANALYSIS. 
At the conclusion of the jury trial, counsel for Smith moved 
for a dismissal of the tampering charge, or in the alternative a 
new trial, on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the conviction. (R. 232-34.) On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals addressed the merits of that argument, Smith. 303 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 17, and stated the following: 
Smith asserts the evidence introduced at trial was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We reverse the 
jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter 
of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
conviction. State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 
1989). Nevertheless, "the standard for reversal is high." Id. 
We will reverse only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime.'" Id. (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983))/ accord State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 
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1985) . We review from a perspective most favorable to the 
verdict the evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn from 
the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding 
witness credibility are solely within the jury's province. 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. 
Though this standard presents a formidable hurdle to the 
criminal appellant, it is not insuperable. Id. "We will not 
make 'speculative leap[s] across . . , gap[s]' in the 
evidence." Id. (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 445). To affirm 
the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State has introduced 
evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged 
crime. Id. 
We begin our review by setting out the elements of the 
crime of evidence tampering. The controlling statute states, 
in pertinent part, that "[a] person commits a felony of the 
second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he . . . 
[a]Iters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a 
purpose to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding 
or investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995). 
Smith, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Although the court sought to set 
out the elements, it merely parroted the language of the statute. 
It did not construe the statute in order to identify the elements. 
In response to Smith's argument that reviewing the elements in 
a tampering case requires construing the statute to define certain 
elements, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Smith's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument incorporates a 
question of statutory construction. He maintains the evidence 
tampering statute implies a requirement that the State prove 
that the evidence with which he tampered was "relevant to 
establishing or disproving facts in an investigation or pro-
ceeding." We have scoured the record and find no mention of 
this argument before the trial court. Because this issue was 
not preserved for appeal, we do not address it. See Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460-61 (Utah App. 
1996). 
Smith, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, n.2. The court then launched into 
a discussion concerning the evidence in support of the verdict. 
The court found the evidence supported that Smith "believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to 
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be instituted" removed garbage from the trailer and later deposited 
it at a convenience store dumpster. "Huggard's testimony shows 
Smith believed an official investigation was 'pending or about to 
be instituted,' id., the first element of the crime." Id. at 16. 
The court then determined that the "second element is met because 
Smith removed something." 303 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. "It is 
undisputed that he caused the drug paraphernalia from the party to 
be cleaned up and placed in a garbage sack, then drove with the 
sack to a distant convenience store and threw the sack in a 
dumpster." Id. 
The court assumed the garbage bag contained "drug parapherna-
lia from the party." That fact was never established and hence 
never necessary to dispute. Indeed, Smith asked the Utah Court of 
Appeals to construe the statute to require the state to prove the 
item with which Smith "tampered" was somehow relevant to a pending 
or potential investigation or proceeding. (Appellant's Brief at 
Point I.) The court declined Smith's request. Smith, 303 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 18, n.2. 
The court was incorrect to decline the question of statutory 
construction in considering the elements of the statute. In U.S. v. 
Cicco, 10 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1993), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered a sufficiency question. 
The sufficiency analysis began by properly interpreting the statute 
and identifying the elements that made up the offense at issue. 
The court stated: 
We will utilize the traditional tools of statutory 
construction in order to determine what conduct constitutes a 
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violation of [the criminal statute]. Thereafter, we will 
analyze whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that Cicco's and Tabbachino's conduct did violate the statute. 
Id. at 983. Such an approach is common place: 
In form the dispute between the parties is little more than a 
disagreement over the evidence necessary to sustain a § 
924(c)(1) conviction; neither side expressly addresses the 
question how the disputed element of the crime, viz. "use," 
ought to be defined. In substance, however, this case is 
about what constitutes use, as opposed to mere possession, of 
a firearm. Only when we have resolved that question can we 
determine the quantum of evidence necessary to convict and 
formulate an appropriate test for assessing whether the 
government has produced that evidence. 
U.S. v. Bailev. 36 F.3d 106, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1994), conviction 
reversed, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). In reversing the convictions in 
Bailey, the United States Supreme Court dedicated its discussion to 
construing the term "use" as used in the criminal statute at issue, 
133 L.Ed.2d at 480-81, even though "neither side expressly add-
ress [ed] " statutory construction of that term in the lower court. 
Bailey, 36 P.3d at 110. After construing the element, the Court 
concluded the government failed to prove it. Thus the evidence was 
insufficient to support conviction. Bailey, 133 L.Ed.2d at 484; see 
also U.S. v. Hollis. 971 F.2d 1441, 1447-49 (10th Cir. 1992) (court 
considers meaning of each element), cert, denied. 123 L.Ed.2d 148 
(1993); U.S. v, Levine, 41 F.3d 607, 610-11 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(sufficiency of the evidence analysis necessarily includes engaging 
in statutory construction to determine elements of the offense); 
cf. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1215-16 (Utah 1993) ("causation" 
of death as element is defined under the reckless manslaughter 
statute in determining sufficiency). 
In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
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conviction, Smith asked the court of appeals to define the elements 
of the offense by engaging in statutory construction. Only when 
the court resolved the question of the elements could it determine 
the quantum of evidence necessary to convict and formulate an 
appropriate test for assessing whether the state had produced 
sufficient evidence to convict. 
Specifically, Smith asked the court to construe the term 
"anything" in the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995) (a 
person commits a felony if he "alters, destroys, or removes any-
thing" ) . To give meaning to the term "anything," the state should 
be required to prove that the "thing" tampered with had some value 
to a pending or possible investigation or proceeding. That element 
is separate from establishing defendant's beliefs and/or knowledge, 
and that defendant removed, altered or destroyed "anything" with 
the requisite mental culpability. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 
(1995) . 
The value of the "thing" would be established with direct 
evidence in the state's possession: the state would ask the officer 
at trial to identify the item in question and explain how or why it 
would be relevant to a potential or pending investigation or 
proceeding. If the officer testified that he checked the item only 
to disregard it as relevant to a pending or potential investigation 
or proceeding, the tampering charge could not be upheld. After 
all, not every "thing" is somehow relevant to a pending or 
potential investigation or proceeding. 
The state did not oppose Smith's request that the court of 
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appeals construe the statute for such an element, nor did the state 
assert that such a "construction" request had been waived. Rather 
the state argued that the inference of intent was sufficient to 
uphold the conviction,1 and that the item a defendant is accused 
of tampering with does not have to be admissible as evidence in a 
potential investigation or proceeding. (Appellee's Brief at 12 
(citing State v. Wacrstaff. 846 P. 2d 1311, 1312 (Utah App.) 
(disavowing notion that item tampered with must be "admissible" to 
support tampering charge), cert. denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993)).) Those matters are irrelevant to construing the term 
"anything" so as to give it meaning. 
B. IF THE COURT HAD DEFINED THE ELEMENTS, IT WOULD HAVE 
DETERMINED THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVIC-
TION, WHERE IT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE "TAMPERED" ITEM HAD 
VALUE TO ANY POTENTIAL OR PENDING INVESTIGATION OR PROCEEDING. 
Assuming the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
infer intent, the state established only certain elements and 
wholly failed to present evidence establishing the value of the 
garbage bag contents to a pending or possible investigation or 
proceeding. See State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1988). 
The conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. 
An illustration is in order to demonstrate the importance of 
1
 According to the state, "intent" was inferred because "1) [Smith 
failed] to report Barrett's death until after he disposed of the 
paraphernalia; 2) [Smith disposed] of the paraphernalia forty-five blocks 
from his home; 3) [he misled] the 911 operator [by suggesting] he had 
reported the death as soon as he discovered it; 4) [he lied] to both the 
911 operator and the investigating detective about drug involvement in 
Mr. Barrett's death; and 5) [he admitted] to police that he removed the 
paraphernalia so that the police would not find it with Mr. Barrett's 
body." (Brief of Appellee filed in the Utah Court of Appeals ("Appellee's 
Brief"), at 11 and 14.) 
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recognizing an element in the tampering offense that establishes 
the value of the item to a pending or potential investigation or 
proceeding: The players are Victim, Suspect and Roommate. Roommate 
owns a legal handgun. Suspect has been after her for sometime to 
get rid of it. Victim and his friends go to a party at Suspect and 
Roommate's home, and Victim brings his gun. Victim shoots and kills 
himself at Suspect's home with his gun. Suspect is scared and 
believes officers will search his home as part of an investigation 
relating to Victim's death. Before calling officers to the scene, 
Suspect again insists that Roommate get rid of her gun. Roommate 
hands a garbage bag to Suspect and Suspect takes the bag to a 
dumpster downtown for disposal. When officers are called to the 
home, they do not locate the gun that killed Victim and they notice 
there is no garbage from the party. They ask Suspect about the gun 
and the garbage, he goes downtown, and he retrieves a garbage bag 
for officers. Suspect is charged with tampering with evidence. At 
trial, the officers recognize the bag and its contents as that 
which was retrieved from the dumpster, but they never testify that 
the garbage bag contained items relevant to the party or Victim's 
death. In its case against Suspect, is the state required to 
present evidence concerning the garbage bag contents and connecting 
the contents to a potential or pending investigation or proceeding? 
Should Suspect be convicted on the lack of evidence? 
The court of appeals' decision in another case is also 
illustrative. In State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah App. 
1988), the defendant was charged with assaulting a police officer 
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while in custody at the Salt Lake County jail. During discovery, 
defendant learned that as part of standard procedures, jail 
personnel made videotapes of bookings and subsequently erased them 
after 72 hours if no one made a request to retain them. Based on 
that information, defendant moved to dismiss the charge and 
asserted that jail personnel recorded the alleged assault on 
videotape, the videotape was relevant to her defense, and jail 
personnel erased the videotape. The trial court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, "for the reason that the state 
failed to retain any videotape of the incident." On appeal, the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Although defense counsel claimed that the erased 
videotape contained evidence material to the defense, no 
evidence was presented that the video equipment was 
operating in the booking area on the appropriate night 
and either actually or most likely captured on tape the 
alleged assault. Defendant thus failed to establish the 
foundational fact of the existence of evidence. 
Id. Because the defendant failed to establish the value of the tape 
to the proceedings, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal.2 
In this matter, although the state was in possession of the 
garbage bag and its contents from the day after the party, February 
2
 See also Gill v. State. 622 So.2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. App. 1993); 
State v. Murray, 349 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. Dist. App. 1977) (in connection 
with the charge of tampering with a witness, the alleged victim must be 
or must have been a fact witness and the defendant must know that the 
alleged victim was a fact witness); State v. Howe. 247 N.W.2d 647, 653 
(N.D. 1976) (in considering the application of a witness tampering 
statute: "All that is necessary is that the person be one who knows or 
is supposed to know material facts and is expected to testify to them or 
to be called on to testify"); State v. Peck. 459 N.W.2d 441, 444 (S.D. 
1990); United States v. Jackson. 513 F.2d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
("Indubitably, one is a witness, within the meaning of [the witness 
tampering statute] , when he knows or is supposed to know material facts, 
and expectably is to be called to testify to them"). 
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21, 1995, to the day of trial, the state failed to elicit 
testimony, even from the officers, as to whether the garbage bag 
contained used drug paraphernalia, items used by Barrett, items 
used in Smith's trailer, or items relevant to a potential or 
pending proceeding or investigation. In point of fact, the garbage 
bag contained a neatly organized package of unused syringes. 
(State's Exhibit 6.) Did officers contemplate those contents in 
connection with some investigation or proceeding, whether or not 
proceedings were instituted? If so, why did they fail to say as 
much at trial?3 Since the state failed to make a showing of value, 
it failed to establish a critical factor. 
The state acknowledged in the court of appeals the relevance 
of establishing the value of the item: "[D]rug paraphernalia found 
at the same location as a body showing signs consistent with a drug 
overdose would provide additional circumstantial evidence as to the 
cause of death. Furthermore, drug paraphernalia would have had 
evidentiary value for possible investigations into defendant's drug 
use, defendant's presence during drug use, defendant providing a 
place for drug use, and defendant's possession of controlled 
substances or paraphernalia.f! (Appellee's Brief at 13.) Because 
the state failed to identify the contents of the garbage bag, the 
state has no basis for asserting that the unused items would have 
had any such "value to the investigation." (Id.) 
3
 The state claimed in the court of appeals that " [t]he [tampering] 
statute does not require potential investigations to ripen into actual 
investigations or criminal actions against defendant" (Appellee's Brief 
at 13) . That proposition does not address the issue of the value of the 
items to an investigation or proceeding. 
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Since the evidence in this matter reflects that the garbage 
bag contained apparently Gerety's unused syringes, the "evidence" 
hardly provides officers with information concerning Barrett's 
cause of death, drug use or drug possession at Smith's trailer. 
Unlike the issue of "intent", which usually is not susceptible to 
direct proof and is often inferred from the circumstances,4 the 
issue of evidentiary value in this matter could be presented only 
by the state and was susceptible to direct proof. The state should 
have been required to establish the value of the garbage bag 
contents to any pending or potential investigation or proceeding. 
See State v. Wooden, 619 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ohio App. 1993). 
"[T]here is no indication" that the garbage bag was further 
"subject to identification and thus its value as evidence is highly 
questionable." Radar v. State. 420 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist. 
App. 1982) . The court of appeals should have considered that issue 
in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 
C. THE LACK OF EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE. 
The court of appeals ruled, "it is undisputed that [Smith] 
caused the drug paraphernalia from the party to be cleaned up and 
placed in a garbage sack." Smith, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 and 18, 
n. 2. At trial the state failed to present evidence that the 
garbage bag actually contained "drug paraphernalia from the party." 
Rather the evidence reflected that Smith wanted drug paraphernalia 
4
 State v. Lonez. 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State 
v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985)) ("intent need not be proved by 
direct evidence, buy may be inferred from defendant's conduct and 
surrounding circumstances"). 
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cleaned up before the police arrived and that he had been after 
Gerety for sometime to discard drug paraphernalia that had been in 
her possession. The garbage bag contained a package of unused 
syringes that likely belonged to Gerety. Nothing in the record 
links the garbage bag contents to "drug paraphernalia from the 
party." Where no evidence has been presented, there is nothing to 
dispute, and no inference can be drawn. See Krauss v. Utah St. 
Deot. of Trans. . 852 P.2d 1014, 1022 (Utah App. 1993) (since trial 
evidence dispelled existence of a critical factor, jury could not 
infer the opposite conclusion), overruled on other grounds, Child 
v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995). The jury "could not, 
by any rational process, have concluded" that the garbage bag 
contained drug paraphernalia from the party. Id. It was incorrect 
for the court of appeals to assume something that did not exist as 
part of the record. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully requests that 
this Court grant certiorari review. 
SUBMITTED this L*bL day of O u ^ ^ , 1997. 
JINDA M. JONESQ L] 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Alan B. Smith appeals his conviction for tampering with 
evidence in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-510 (1995) . We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
"On appeal, we recite the facts in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict." state v. Bilrft. 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
During a gathering at Smith's trailer home on the evening of 
February 20, 1995, a group of people, including John C. Barrett, 
drank alcohol and ingested drugs. At a point between 10:00 p.m. 
and 1:00 a.m., Barrett collapsed. Some of the guests suggested 
calling 911, but no one did. .Attempting to revive Barrett, one 
of the guests administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation, then 
Smith and others moved Barrett to a bathtub with cold water. 
Afterward, Smith helped wrap Barrett in a blanket and move him to 
a bed. Around 3:00 a.m., Smith's two remaining guests—Valerie 
Mackert and Othello Gerety—heard Barrett breathing as well as 
snoring. However, during the early morning hours, Barrett died 
from the toxic mixture of cocaine, heroin, and alcohol in his 
system. 
Sometime between Barrett's collapse and morning, Smith 
directed Mackert and Gerety to clean up the drug paraphernalia 
lying about the trailer. They placed the paraphernalia in a 
garbage bag. Having checked on Barrett and believing him to be 
dead, at about 11:00 a.m. Smith took the bag of garbage and 
paraphernalia and drove with Mackert and Gerety to a convenience 
store about forty-five blocks away, where he threw the bag into 
the store's dumpster. After running other errands, Smith and 
Mackert returned to the trailer. Smith called 911 shortly before 
3:30 p.m. to report Barrett*s death. 
Police officers arrived to investigate Barrett's death and 
questioned Smith. Detective Alex Huggard later took Smith to the 
police station. Between interviews there, Smith led Detective 
Huggard to the dumpster to retrieve the bag containing the 
paraphernalia. 
Regarding Barrett's death, the State charged Smith with 
manslaughter, failing to report a dead body, and evidence 
tampering. The jury acquitted Smith of manslaughter, but 
convicted him of failing to report a dead body and evidence 
tampering. The trial court later granted Smith's motion to 
dismiss the charge of failing to report a dead body, but denied 
his motion to dismiss the evidence tampering charge. Smith now 
appeals his conviction for tampering with evidence, arguing the 
State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction 
and the trial court should have granted his motion to sever the 
charges against him.1 
1. Smith also challenges the admission at his trial of Gerety's 
testimony from the preliminary hearing. The trial court 
determined she was an unavailable witness under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804(a)(5) and thus allowed her prior testimony to be 
read into evidence under Rule 804(b)(1), an exception to the 
hearsay rule. Because her testimony was not necessary to support 
the evidence tampering charge, the trial court's error, if any, 
in admitting her prior testimony was harmless. In other words, 
we do not believe a more favorable result was reasonably likely 
for Smith without her testimony. £££ state v. Featherston. 781 
P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Sufficiency of Evidence 
Smith asserts the evidence introduced at trial was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict.2 We reverse the 
jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. 
State v- ff*T-™*nr 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). 
Nevertheless, Hthe standard for reversal is high." id. We will 
reverse only if the evidence is so *•inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.1" id. 
(quoting State v, Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); aCCQrd 
Stat-.* y| Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review from 
a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all 
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that 
determinations regarding witness credibility are solely within 
the jury's province. ELannan, 767 P.2d at 568. 
Though this standard presents a formidable hurdle to the 
criminal appellant, it is not insuperable. Td. "We will not 
make •speculative leapfs] across . * . gap[s] • in the evidence.tf 
Id*, (quoting Petree. 659 P.2d at 445). To affirm the jury's 
verdict, we must be sure the State has introduced evidence 
sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime. Td. 
We begin our review by setting out the elements of the crime 
of evidence tampering. The controlling statute states, in 
pertinent part, that "[a] person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he . . . [a]Iters, 
destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair 
its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation.11 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-510 (1995). 
Detective Huggard's testimony regarding his unrecorded first 
interview with Smith was the primary evidence proving the 
elements of this crime. Huggard testified Smith told him that 
2. Smith1* sufficiency-of-evidence argument incorporates a 
question of statutory construction. He maintains the evidence 
tampering statute implies a requirement that the State prove that 
the evidence with which he tampered was "relevant to establishing 
or disproving facts in an investigation or proceeding.11 We have 
scoured the record and find no mention of this argument before 
the trial court. Because this issue was not preserved for 
appeal, we do not address it. fi£fi TOIMTI v. Winchester Hills 
Water PP. . 912 P.2d 457, 460-61 (Utah App. 1996). 
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Smith directed Othello [Gerety] and Valerie 
[Mackert] to clean up the house, to get all 
of the drug paraphernalia, to get all of that 
out of the house. He told me that he did not 
want to have to explain to the police, when 
they came and found a body, about all of the 
drug paraphernalia. 
Huggard further testified: 
Smith had told me that the reason that he 
instructed the clean-up of his trailer was 
that he did not think that John [Barrett] 
would make it and he did not want to have the 
drug paraphernalia there with John when the 
police come [sic] and found the body. 
Huggard1s testimony shows Smith believed an official 
investigation was "pending or about to be instituted," jjzL_, the 
first element of the crime. Smith recognized that once he called 
to report the dead body in his trailer the police would 
inevitably investigate the cause of Barrett's death. The second 
element is met because Smith removed something. It is undisputed 
that he caused the drug paraphernalia from the party to be 
cleaned up and placed in a garbage sack, then drove with the sack 
to a distant convenience store and threw the sack in a dumpster. 
Finally, Huggard1 s testimony that Smith "did not want to have the 
drug paraphernalia there with John when the police come [sic] and 
found the body" supports the jury's inference that Smith's 
purpose in removing the paraphernalia was to impair its 
availability in the police investigation. The third element was 
thus met. 
Still, Smith argues Huggardfs testimony regarding their 
recorded second interview showed Smith's statements were 
inconsistent with those of their unrecorded first interview and 
did not support the evidence tampering conviction. He further 
asserts the jury could have inferred an innocent purpose from 
Smith's undisputed activities that day~e.g., that he was merely 
cleaning up after a party, and the trash dumpster was so full he 
could not fit the sack containing the paraphernalia there, so he 
carried it to a convenience store dumpster to dispose of it. 
"The presentation of conflicting evidence does not preclude 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, no 
defendant could ever be convicted in a criminal case where 
inconsistent evidence was introduced." state v. carlsen. 638 
P.2d 512, 514-15 (Utah 1981). The jury, within its function as 
the arbiter of witness credibility, obviously elected to believe 
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the version of the facts from Detective Huggard's testimony about 
his unrecorded first interview with Smith. Sfifi id. at 515. 
Accordingly, considered from a perspective most advantageous 
to the verdict, Detective Huggard's testimony reasonably supports 
the juryfs decision that, believing an official investigation 
would take place, Smith removed the paraphernalia with the 
purpose of impairing its availability in the investigation. We 
therefore conclude sufficient evidence supported Smith*s 
conviction for tampering with evidence. 
II• Severance 
Smith next argues the trial court should have granted his 
motion to sever the charges against him for trial. Specifically, 
Smith contends the offenses were improperly joined as •• otherwise 
connected together in their commission" under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-8a-l(l)(a) (1995). Alternatively, Smith argues that even if 
the offenses were connected within the meaning of section 77-8a-
1(1) (a) the trial court should have found he was prejudiced by 
the joinder and ordered severance under Utah Code Ann. 5 77-8a-
1(4)(a) (1995).4 
The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a severance 
request. Stai-* v. Lopez. 789 P#2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 1990). 
"[W]e reverse a conviction only if the trial judge's refusal to 
sever charges 'is a clear abuse of discretion in that it 
sacrifices the defendants right to a fundamentally fair trial.f" 
IdL (quoting fii-»te v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977)). 
A court should sever charges when it concludes that "'prejudice 
to the defendant outweighs considerations of economy and 
practicalities of judicial administration, with doubts being 
resolved in favor of severance.,w State v. JaiTneg- 817 P.2d 822, 
825 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 
444-45 (Utah 1986)) . 
3. Perhaps the jury accepted the State fs explanation that Smith 
was naturally more guarded once the tape recorder was activated. 
4. Smith also argues two other grounds upon which severance 
should have been granted. These involve Rule 9.5 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause. However, 
we do not reach those grounds because they were not presented to 
the trial court and thus were not preserved for appeal. See 
lalman, 912 p.2d at 46o-6i. 
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A. "Connected Together" 
Smith maintains the offenses with which he was charged 
should not have been joined because they were not "connected 
together in their commission."5 Utah-Code Ann, S 77-8a-l(l)(a) 
(1995). We disagree. 
Section 77-8a-l(l) reads: 
Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or 
both, may be charged in the same indictment 
or information if each offense is a separate 
count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are 
otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a 
common scheme or plan. 
Xduu Because Utah courts have not yet interpreted the phrase 
"otherwise connected in their commission," we seek guidance from 
our sibling states and the federal courts in determining how it 
applies in this case. S&& State v. Leer 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
We have surveyed cases construing the language at issue in 
similar fact situations—those in which a defendants later 
offense arose out of an attempt to somehow conceal his or her 
previous criminal activities. Such cases have generally held 
something akin to what the Kansas Supreme Court has articulated 
so well: "[W]hen criminal conduct resulting in a second charge 
is precipitated by a previous charge, the two are sufficiently 
•connected together1 to allow consolidation for trial," State v. 
Pondexter, 67i p.2d 539, 546 (Kan. 1983); sfifi United States Y, 
Carmichael,, 685 F.2d 903, 910 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
££2£L, 659 F.2d 585, 589 (5th cir. 1981); United States v, 
BPUraSSa, 411 F.2d 69, 74-75 (10th Cir. 1969); Bayless v. United 
States, 381 F-2d 67, 71-72 (9th cir. 1967); State v, Williams, 
904 p.2d 437, 444-45 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Griffin, 866 p.2d 
1156, 1160 (N.M. 1993). 
Many of these "precipitation cases" seem to share as a 
common element of their analysis the conclusion that "most of the 
evidence admissible in proof of one offense is also admissible in 
proof of the other," Williams. 904 P.2d at 444. For example, 
5. Both parties decided these offenses were not "based on the 
same conduct" or "part of a common scheme or plan" and treated 
this as an otherwise-connected-together-in-their-commission case. 
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evidence of the second offense may be admissible to show the 
defendant's guilty conscience related to the first offense, seef 
e,g^, i£L.; Bourassa. 411 F.2d at 74-75; State v. Bravo. 639 P.2d 
358# 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). Likewise, evidence of the first 
offense may be admissible to show the defendant's motive for 
committing the second offense—i.e., to conceal criminal 
activities, see, e.g./ Bay less, 381 F.2d at 72. 
The case at bar involves a precipitation situation. Smith 
failed to report Barrett's dead body and threw the drug 
paraphernalia in the store dumpster to conceal the illegal drug 
activities that caused him to be charged with the first offense 
of manslaughter. Moreover, evidence of each offense "was 
admissible to prove the other offenses. See Williams. 904 P.2d 
at 446. For instance, that Smith attempted to conceal the drug 
paraphernalia tends to show consciousness of his potential guilt 
regarding manslaughter. And, evidence of Smith's involvement in 
Barrett's drug-related death tends to show Smith's motive for 
evidence tampering—i.e., to conceal the circumstances 
surrounding Barrett's death. We therefore conclude the charges 
against Smith were "otherwise connected together in their 
commission" under Utah Code Ann. S 77-8a-l(l)(a) (1995). 
B. Prejudice 
Regardless of the connection between the offenses charged, 
Smith argues the trial court should have granted his severance 
motion because he was prejudiced by joinder of the counts. "'The 
burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the 
ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed on review. 
The defendant must show something more than the fact that "a 
separate trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal."f" 
United spates v. Van Scov. 482 F.2d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1973) 
(citations omitted). 
The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is 
prejudiced by joinder is "whether evidence of the other crime 
would have been admissible in a separate trial." Leer 831 P.2d 
at 118. To determine whether evidence of manslaughter and 
failing to report a dead body would have been admissible at a 
separate trial on evidence tampering, we apply Utah Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), see %A.. which states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
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knowledge, ident i ty , or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
We have already determined the manslaughter evidence would 
have been admissible in separate trials for failing to report a 
dead body and evidence tampering to prove Smith's motive for 
concealing the drug paraphernalia. That evidence also tended to 
show that Smith1 s intent or purpose was not merely to throw out 
garbage elsewhere because the trailer park's dumpster was full, 
but was to conceal the illegal activities leading to Barrett's 
death.6 S&& Lfi£, 831 P.2d at 119; Lopez
 r 789 P.2d at 43; SS& 
also Williams, 904 P.2d at 445 (recognizing defendant may have 
had other reasons for his actions, but noting alternative 
explanations go to weight of evidence, not admissibility) . Thus, 
evidence of Smith's other charged offenses would have been 
admissible under Rule 404(b). 
Still, the probative value of the evidence must "outweigh 
its tendency to unfairly prejudice the defendant in order to be 
admissible" under Utah Rule of Evidence 403.7 Lsa, 831 P.2d at 
119. Here, the manslaughter evidence was highly probative to 
show Smith's motive and intent regarding the failure to report a 
dead body and evidence tampering charges. Without that evidence, 
the jury would have had no context within which to place either 
subsequent charge. Indeed, presentation of the manslaughter 
evidence was the only way the State could effectively provide 
proof of Smith's motive and intent regarding the other two 
charged offenses. See id. 
Consequently, although admission of the manslaughter 
evidence would naturally prejudice Smith, the evidence's 
probative value "significantly outweigh[ed] any prejudicial 
effect," id. Further mitigating any prejudice, the trial court 
specifically instructed the jury to decide each count 
individually and to ensure the State had proved every element of 
6. "[I]ntent fneed not be proved by direct evidence, but may be 
inferred from defendants conduct and surrounding 
circumstances••" State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39f 43 (Utah App. 
1990) (quoting *tato v. Davis. 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985)). 
7. Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumxilative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 
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every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.8 fififi state v. Danker, 
599 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1979); State v. ttm-V. 839 P.2d 880, 883-
84 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); fififi 
AlSa State v. MunHnis-Villaraal. 702 P.2d 670, 675 (Ariz. 1985) 
(holding similar instruction minimized prejudice to defendant); 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 149 (1991) ("Cautionary instructions to 
the jury to the effect that each charge or count is to be decided 
separately or that the evidence should not be considered 
cumulatively have generally been considered sufficient to prevent 
prejudice or confusion by the jury where the charges are tried in 
a single proceeding.11) . 
Because the offenses with which Smith was charged were 
"otherwise connected together in their commission" and he was not 
unfairly prejudiced by their joinder, we conclude the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Smiths severance motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The State presented sufficient evidence to support Smith's 
conviction for evidence tampering. In addition, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith's motion to sever 
the charges against him. Accordingly, we affirm. 
No£man H. Jacksorff Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
8. Apparently the jury was able to follow this instruction—they 
acquitted Smith of manslaughter. 
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